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On September 28th, 2003 there was a power failure in large parts of Italy as a result of
the interruption of only two power lines. The primarily local blackout led to failures
in the central information and communication network which manages the electricity
network. These errors led to shutdowns of other power stations which in turn resulted
in the switch-off of communication nodes until finally the main part of the Italian
power supply collapsed. In analogy to the dependency between electricity network and
information and communication network, the financial crisis demonstrated the cross-
industry interdependencies that exist between the highly networked banking industry
and the value network of the real economy. In contrast to the blackout limited to Italy,
the effects of the financial crisis were global.
In both examples it appears that not only individual networks (e.g., electricity net-
works) are very susceptible to external effects, but that just in case of interdependencies
with other networks (information and communication) unexpected effects are possi-
ble. In particular, the cascade of errors resulting from these interdependencies may have
massive impacts on the participating networks.
In the globally networked economy each individual company is part of a larger net-
work, consisting of a large number of such “interdependent networks”. In the following,
we therefore consider a company as part of a “risk network”. Such networks involve very
large opportunities, but the companies are also exposed to a corresponding “systemic
risk”. In the current discussion, this notion is mainly used in relation to the financial
services industry and regulatory interventions. As the starting example indicated, how-
ever, its scope can and must be expanded: In our understanding, “systemic risk is at
hand if an event that has an influence on an element of a system can have a negative
impact on the system as a whole as a result of the dynamic interdependencies between
the elements of the system, or if – as a result of the interdependencies between the
elements – the impact of several events that influence individual elements overlap in
a way that they can have a negative impact on the system as a whole” (Romeike and
Hager 2009; translated).
In some industries (e.g., pharmaceutics, aerospace) regulating authorities have taken
on comprehensive control and try to identify and prevent systemic risk. In case of the
less or – still – inadequately regulated industries (e.g., financial services) and particu-
larly in unregulated industries, which generate the largest part of our gross domestic
product, it is necessary for every single company to identify systemic risk on their own
and develop appropriate hedging strategies based on that. In order to enable compa-
nies to do so, however, it is necessary to create the informational basis for a targeted
handling of systemic risk. On the one hand, this refers to the modeling of the risk net-
work. On the other hand, it refers to concepts for the standardized exchange and the
presentation of information on the risk and dependence structure within the network.
By consciously dealing with dependencies in and between interdependent networks,
each company may contribute to the stabilization of the overall risk network.
Now, the question arises which contribution business and information systems engi-
neering (BISE) can make in this context for the stabilization of the entire risk network.
To answer this question we must first realize what patterns lead to the occurrence of
systemic risk and the resulting crises in the past.
Ultimately, all networks that are prone to systemic risk can be mainly characterized
by the following four properties:
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1. The networks are complex and not transparent as a result of their product and/or
process structures.
2. The actions of central actors in such structures lead to external (domino) effects
which may result in damage for third parties – although these are not involved in
the actual event.
3. The system is destabilized through strong individual incentives and the use of asym-
metric information for individual benefit.
4. Supervision and regulation do not exist, have shortcomings, or are subject to restric-
tions that prevent effective intervention.
The current financial crisis offers an excellent basis to study how a future occurrence of
these four conditions can be identified earlier and how we can respond in an appropri-
ate manner. Therefore, we will discuss and generalize some of the points below using
the example of the financial crisis and also address the (possible) role of BISE.
1 Networks Are Complex and not Transparent
Only a few decades ago, the vast majority of financial services was limited to just three
roles: investors, debtors, and the bank as an intermediary. This system worked quite
well for many decades and was largely stable. Meanwhile, the bank has been replaced
by a whole chain of successive financial intermediaries: the lending bank gives loans to
another institution which bundles them to securities with those of other banks. This
second intermediary passes them over to a third actor who carves the packages of se-
curities and repackages them, probably finances the acquisition through new credits,
passes on the emerging securities to a fourth intermediary, etc. until finally the end
products arrive at a placing bank and/or their customers. As a result of the described
fragmentation, the final products can hardly longer be understood in terms of return,
cost, and risk impact. The information has been gradually lost in the multi-stage pro-
cess.
The solution can only be to create significantly higher transparency. Also in the fi-
nancial services industry we need transparent product structures in terms of parts lists
based on standard taxonomies, i.e., global standards. If a product is passed on to the
next actor, it must be accompanied by a standard description of parts lists, which even-
tually becomes the substructure in a new and more complex product.
The role of BISE here is twofold. On the one hand, IT was involved in the emergence
of the problem. Without information technology the fragmentation of the value chain
of the financial services industry would not have been possible. On the other hand,
BISE is the key to realize an improved, i.e. more transparent representation of products
and processes not only in the financial services industry. While more regulated indus-
tries with high risk, such as pharmaceuticals and aircraft manufacturers, have already
implemented some of these requirements, the large remainder of the economy should
follow in its own interest: For example, also the manufacturing sector possibly depends
on raw materials or resources over several levels of the value chain, which might be-
come a systemic risk due to an uncertain supply in the future. This also partly requires
significant changes to operational product and transaction systems.
2 Actions of Key Actors Result in External (Domino) Effects, Leading to
Damage for Third Parties
Network structures are unproblematic and may even reduce risk as long as individual
players do not achieve a dominant position. In certain areas of the financial services
industry, however, individual actors have attracted so much business that they became
indispensable for the stability of the network. A familiar example is the U.S. market
for credit default swaps (CDS), in which five actors cover more than 90% of the total
business. The failure of one actor leads to such high losses on the opposite sides that
these too would tilt like dominoes. This condition is commonly referred to as “system-
relevant” or “too big to fail” as (state) interventions in case of failure are usually in-
evitable.
The solution is to internalize such external effects which emanate from actors that
are too big or too networked. This first requires modeling and quantifying the external
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effects that may become dangerous. On this basis, collaterals of each actor are to be de-
termined (in the financial services industry this may include capital needs, in the power
grid these may be possible over- or undercapacities) depending on the extent of poten-
tial damage, i.e. ultimately depending on the size and the level of interconnectedness in
the defined network.
In addition it is possible to optimize a network: In the power grid, this is done by
an already existing overarching control authority (which is, however, not immune to
systemic risk as described above). In the financial sector a central counterparty should
be established for CDS so that the collapse of a single actor can be buffered.
The tasks of BISE can be derived inversely. First, complex models have to be imple-
mented in the IT systems. This requires appropriate algorithms as well as the infras-
tructure for the procurement, management, and consolidation of extensive volumes of
data. Here, the decision between “realistic enough” and “still manageable” constitutes
a balancing act. Second, the calculation of the risk position of a single actor (in the fi-
nancial services industry, this is the capital need of an individual institution) based on
cross-linked risk models will become even more sophisticated than today. Third, new
central control instances require high levels of investment in appropriate IT solutions.
3 People Act According to Individual Incentives and Use Asymmetric
Information to Their Own Benefit
Employees and managers in customer services and commercial departments of banks
partly have substantial variable salary components, which often depend on the gen-
erated business volume or the expected margin. This may make them urge customers
to conclude a transaction which runs counter to their interests. This danger particu-
larly exists if bonuses paid to consultants and dealers do not depend on the realized
long-term success of the customer, but on the anticipated short-term success of the fi-
nancial services provider. Similarly, a financial services provider may keep options in
the books for which the counterparty is its own customer. Then incentives for holding
back information and for speculation against the customer arise. Also the owners and
shareholders of financial services providers had to face an asymmetric incentive struc-
ture in the past: In good times, a dividend is paid out and the market value increases.
In bad times, however, there is only a very limited risk of loss since the government will
intervene in case of difficulties. On the part of the financial services provider, this leads
to incentives to reduce equity and thus increase the risk.
Not only in the financial services industry the consequence of such incentives is that
the parties involved force their risk network more and more to the extreme and thus
destabilize it. Therefore, the heart of all attempts at a solutions is information: Incen-
tive structures need to be synchronized with the interests of all actors concerned in a
noticeable way.
In the financial services industry this may, for example, be achieved by introducing
fees for consulting services instead of commissions, by higher fixed and lower vari-
able incomes, by variable incomes depending on realized instead of anticipated profits,
or through disbursement of profits in the products generated by the dealer. Proposals
to regulatorily separate investment banking and commercial banking are going even
further. Regarding the equity investors the same applies as discussed above: Financial
actors must no longer be “too big to fail”, the capital of such institutions should be
increased accordingly.
The role of BISE in the implementation of new incentives within a company is the
provision of new or enhanced dispositive systems. The change from commission to fee
consulting, for example, requires new structures of control. All bonus formulas and
capital calculations as well as all necessary data need to be included in the IT. In cross-
company settings, the synchronization of incentive systems constitutes a special chal-
lenge for BISE: In order to avoid systemic risk and yet not to publish any information
relevant for competition, new methods for the aggregation and anonymization of risk
information with trusted third parties or for secure multi-party computation are re-
quired.
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4 Supervision and Regulation Do not Exist, Have Shortcomings, or Are
Subject to Restrictions
The risks described above are not only known since the current financial crisis. Hence,
financial markets are monitored more intensively than many other markets, but ap-
parently not intensively enough. The financial supervision had no mandate to control
non-banks in the chain between investors and borrowers, i.e. special purpose vehicles,
conduits, and hedge funds. Moreover, it had only a very limited view of the interna-
tional dependencies. Central banks were under pressure to cut interest rates further
and to facilitate budget deficits in order to (supposedly) stimulate growth in the short
term. The European Central Bank with its independent position and with its clear man-
date for currency stability was able to withstand the pressure without larger problems.
For other central banks this was more difficult, especially when the mandate for cur-
rency stability was mixed with mandates for economic growth and employment. The
fiscal authorities have resorted to deficit financing to an unacceptable level, whether
for increased expenditures of the state or for the stimulation of private expenditures,
such as home loan financing. Finally, this real economic activator is a key driver of the
current financial crisis. For the financial services industry, the necessary solutions are
obvious. The legislative body must award a sufficiently broad and deep mandate to the
financial market authority. Central banks must focus on the task of stabilizing the mon-
etary value and must not be abused for short-term (assumed) growth interests. Fiscal
authorities must be slowed significantly in debt financing.
However, increased supervision and regulation is not appropriate for every indus-
try and certainly is not the only instrument. In addition or as an alternative, a cross-
company data exchange within the risk network must ensure that each individual com-
pany is able to identify systemic risk without forcing every individual market partici-
pant to immediately reveal competitive information.
To address these tasks, BISE with its interdisciplinary nature plays a prominent role.
BISE can provide the framework to make the complexity of a risk network recogniz-
able and manageable. With its modeling competence, BISE is particularly well suited to
develop methods and concepts for modeling a risk network and for identifying system-
relevant threatening scenarios. Here, BISE can resort to established methods of network
theory and behavioral finance. Moreover, it is only possible to create the informational
foundation by means of the appropriate design and control of the information flow
and standardized data exchange formats in order to develop suitable hedging strategies
across companies. Hence, one future task of BISE might be the creation of information
architecture for the detection of and verification architecture for the avoidance of sys-
temic risks in interdependent networks. Here, the experience from past systemic crises,
such as the current financial and economic crisis, can be applied to other industries and
other types of dependencies.
If BISE can achieve to equip companies with the information necessary for the de-
tection and prevention of systemic risk, then these companies will stabilize not only




Romeike F, Hager P (2009) Erfolgsfaktor Risiko-Management 2.0: Methoden, Beispiele, Check-
listen, 2nd edn. Gabler, Wiesbaden
1At this point, we would like to thank Dr. Gilbert Fridgen and Dr. Björn Häckel for their com-
prehensive support in writing this editorial and for their numerous contributions in terms of
content.
336 Business & Information Systems Engineering 6|2010
